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In this paper, Lumer offers a comprehensive theory of philosophical argument types. His
main target is a theory of philosophical arguments rather than philosophical theories,1 but
he also rightly notes that philosophical theories and philosophical arguments cannot be
neatly pulled apart. After all, philosophers offer arguments for their theories, and without
the arguments, the theories are hardly philosophical.
I won’t summarize the paper here, nor will I describe the many parts of the paper
that I found useful and instructive. Instead, I will jump into four points about the view
Lumer develops that I thought bear further discussion. The first has to do with onticpractical arguments; the second is about the problem of the criterion; the third is about the
role of intuitions in philosophy; and the fourth is about the status of bad philosophical
arguments, or philosophical arguments that don’t fit into the ideal argument types that
Lumer articulates.
1. Pascalian arguments
The first point I want to make is about Pascalian ontic-practical arguments. Lumer writes:
More promising transcendental justifications are practical justifications in the style
of Pascal's wager, which try to show: Despite the absence of any empirical proof of
the existence of these hypothetical parts or structures of reality, it is better to
behave as if they existed. (p.9)
And,
The best known [example of an ontic-practical, transcendental argument] is Kant's
analytical-synthetic approach, about which I already said above that it cannot be
successful. Pascal's wager – i.e. the justification of the thesis that it is practically
better to behave as if the transcendental thesis were true – on the other hand
introduces a type of argumentation that could well be successful and represents a
compromise: On the one hand, it leaves the actual transcendental question – 'does
this (structure of) reality exist?' – unanswered; there is simply no empirical basis for
answering it. … On the other hand, it shows that our behaviour of simply assuming
1

Though sometimes Lumer seems to have in mind philosophical theories in general, e.g., p.6.

that these questions are answered in a certain sense is quite rational: it is practically
rational; and this is shown with practical arguments. (p.13)
Pascal’s own argument, however, did not only aim to show that it is better to act as if the
relevant structure of reality exists (that is, to act as if God exists and there is an immortal
soul and so on). Pascal aimed to show that it is better to believe that God exists.2 Pascal’s
goal was to give what are nowadays sometimes called “state-given” reasons for belief. He
argued that the expected value of believing in God’s existence is infinitely better than the
expected value of not believing in God’s existence.3
Pascal was also, however, not a doxastic voluntarist: he did not think that belief is
subject to the will, in the sense of responding to practical or state-given reasons for belief.
So recognizing that it’s practically better to believe than not to believe in God’s existence
isn’t the kind of thing that can bring a person to form the target belief. This is where the
“behaving as if the relevant thesis were true” comes in: Pascal claims that it’s better to
believe that God exists, and the way to cultivate that belief is to listen to religious sermons,
cultivate relationships with people who believe it, and generally to behave as though God
exists. Eventually, one would feel it easier to come to believe that God exists. That’s the
point of Pascal’s argument: we shouldn’t just behave as if God exists; we need to cultivate
the belief itself.
Further on, Lumer writes:
Pascal arguments (Lumer 1997) are practical arguments for theoretical theses. They
are arguments for a value judgment of the kind that it is optimal to behave as if a
certain thesis p were true. They presuppose that no theoretical information about p
is available, so that no probability can be established. (emphasis his)
Above I have suggested that some Pascal arguments, including Pascal’s own argument, are
not only arguments for behaving as if a certain thesis p were true; they are arguments for
having the belief that p.
But a further point about such arguments is that I’m not sure that they presuppose
that no theoretical information about p is available. Here’s an example:
Sam’s daughter, Wendy, has been selected for an important but dangerous mission
to the bottom of the sea. A deep-sea craft has been built for the purpose, and it has
been constructed as well as humanly possible. The experts expect that Wendy’s
2

See Pascal, Pensées. Much of the passage is ambiguous on the question of whether Pascal is recommending belief
in God or merely behaving as if God exists. But p.68 clarifies that it is belief that is recommended, for in response to
the complaint that we can’t just bring ourselves to believe in response to the wager, Pascal responds that if we
engage in certain behaviours to appease our feelings / passions, we will find it gradually easier to come to believe.
Having the target belief is the ultimate goal.
3
The argument is that the state of belief in the existence of God is better than the state of not believing in the
existence of God. That’s why this is a state-given reason: it has to do with the value of the state itself. State-given
reasons contrast with object-given reasons, which are provided by the properties of the object that the belief is about.
The object of belief is a proposition, and an object-given reason for belief would be that one possesses good
evidence indicating that the proposition is true.

mission has a good chance of success, but the crushing pressure of the deep sea
being what it is, there is only a 40% chance that the craft will survive. So, Sam has
information available that supports an assignment of .4 probability to the
proposition that Wendy will survive the mission.
After Wendy sets out on the mission, Sam finds the possibility of Wendy’s
dying extremely distressing. In order to avoid that emotional distress, Sam holds
firm to his belief that Wendy is alive and will return safe and sound.
In this example, Sam’s thinking can be viewed in Pascalian terms. The proposition in
question is that Wendy is alive and will return safe and sound. Sam counts belief in that
proposition as extremely (though not infinitely) valuable, and he counts it extremely
disvaluable to disbelieve or to withhold judgment on that proposition. He therefore goes
ahead and continues believing it. Moreover, we can view this as an ontic-practical
argument, because Sam is holding a belief about the existence of an entity or structure in
reality (namely, Wendy’s remaining alive), and the argument is based on the value of
having the target belief.
Now, one might doubt that Sam’s decision to believe something which his evidence
only supports with a .4 probability is really rational. But that’s beside the point here. What
matters is that (1) Sam doesn’t hold his belief in the absence of theoretical information, and
(2) his belief and reason for holding it is relevantly like Pascal’s argument. It’s not based on
the possible gain or loss of infinite happiness, but it is based on the value associated with
the states of believing or disbelieving / suspending judgment regarding the target
proposition.
Perhaps Lumer’s formulation of Pascalian arguments in terms of behaviour rather
than belief, and in terms of a lack of theoretical information bearing on the proposition, is
the result of a judgment about the quality of Pascalian arguments. That is, perhaps Lumer’s
view is that only Pascalian arguments formulated in these terms can ever rationally
support their conclusions, and so, in line with the idealizing-hermeneutic project here, he
excludes other Pascalian arguments from the idealized category of philosophical argument.
But I still wonder whether Pascalian arguments formulated in terms of belief, and
formulated in the presence of some theoretical information bearing on the target
proposition, might ever be good arguments.
2. The problem of the criterion
A basic methodological problem we face any time we want to give a general
characterization of a category or concept is the problem of the criterion (POC). The POC
rears its head when it comes to defining fundamental concepts such as knowledge, and
importantly for the purpose of this paper, such as philosophy itself. In this paper, Lumer
gives us a definition of philosophical argument, which is close to a definition of philosophy
itself.
The problem of the criterion is the problem of determining in a non-questionbegging way the basis on which we will give our definition. In the case of the definition of
knowledge, Chisholm puts the point this way. What we want is an answer to two sets of
questions:

A) “What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge?”
B) “How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of knowledge?”
(1982, pp.65-6, italics in original)
We want to know how to define the concept of knowledge, and we can do so either (i) by
identifying cases of knowledge and cases of non-knowledge, then identifying the distinctive
features of each kind of case, and extrapolating a definition, or (ii) by providing a criterion
that will help us decide what counts as knowledge in the first place, and then using that
criterion to identify that various genuine items of knowledge. However, if we proceed as in
(i), and identify the cases of knowledge first, then we appear to be presupposing some
criteria that allow us to correctly distinguish the cases of knowledge and non-knowledge.
(Lumer also offers further criticisms of the bottom-up approach in defining philosophical
argument on p.4.) But we also cannot proceed as in (ii) without presupposing an answer to
the question of which of the particular cases are cases of knowledge. (Chisholm calls
method (i) “particularism” and method (ii) “methodism”. These are analogous to what
Lumer calls “bottom-up” and “top-down” approaches in giving an account of philosophy /
philosophical argument.) If these are the only options, then it’s hard to see how there might
be a non-question-begging way to define concepts like these.
Note that the POC is a problem only at the meta-level. The POC doesn’t threaten our
knowledge by and large; it only threatens to make it impossible to do meta-epistemology—
to gain knowledge of what knowledge itself is. Similarly, the POC doesn’t threaten our
capacity to engage in philosophical inquiry and argument; it only threatens to make it
impossible to do meta-philosophy—to gain knowledge of what philosophical argument is.
I bring all of this up because Lumer offers us a response to the POC that aims to
avoid both the particularist (bottom-up) and the methodist (top-down) approach. Lumer’s
approach is idealizing-hermeneutic. Briefly, Lumer proceeds to define philosophy ( /
philosophical argument) by identifying a broad range of arguments that have been called
philosophical, and then, in light of the types of premises used, the argumentative structures
employed, the types of conclusions argued for, and the goals philosophers have in mind
when they give these arguments, Lumer brings together these various arguments into
several categories, and he offers recommendations about which arguments are capable of
achieving philosophers’ reasonable goals when they use such arguments. So Lumer’s
approach is not merely descriptive; it is also prescriptive. It describes various arguments
that have been traditionally called philosophical, but it also makes judgments about which
of these arguments can constitute good philosophical argument, arguments that are
appropriate for achieving the reasonable purposes for which the arguments are given.
Bondy and Olson (2015) also offered a strategy for avoiding the POC in the context
of the definition of knowledge. They proposed that we begin defining knowledge, not by
identifying the various things that we know to be knowledge, and not by providing a
criterion for determining what really is knowledge, but instead by identifying which cases
people are intuitively inclined to call knowledge. Then the proposal was to identify features
common to, and distinctive of, those cases. The idea is that this way, we can get at the
content of the concept of knowledge, without presupposing that there are any particular
cases of it, and without first offering a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for
knowledge.
What Bondy and Olson’s proposal did not include was a reference to the goals in
light of which attributions of knowledge are made, or the purpose for which people would

have a concept of knowledge. That practical twist in the approach to analyzing
knowledge—and philosophy—strikes me as both potentially useful, and (perhaps)
potentially problematic.
The practical, goal-oriented twist seems useful, because the goals that people have,
and the function that a concept of knowledge might serve, seem like they might help us to
identify what are the salient and what are the uninteresting or accidental features common
to the cases of knowledge. And they might help us to cull the mistaken or degenerate cases
of knowledge-attribution from our pool of cases of knowledge.
It seems potentially problematic, however, insofar as I’m unsure that an analysis of
knowledge must really end up serving the goals that philosophers, and people generally,
have when they use the concept of “knowledge.” For instance, some epistemologists
nowadays think that knowledge isn’t really all that important; instead, what we really care
about is understanding (e.g., Kvanvig 2003). We’ve just historically failed to untangle
knowledge and understanding, and we’ve historically thought that knowledge would be
easy to define and identify, and so we’ve failed to recognize that knowledge isn’t all that
important.
Similarly, in the context of a theory of philosophical argument, if we’re going to use
the goals that philosophers have when they argue, or at least the goals that seem
reasonable for philosophers to have when they argue, to help us organize our account of
philosophical argument, and to help us in deciding which argument types to count as
philosophical, I’m unsure about whether we’re excluding some argument types that should
count as philosophical. I’ll come back to this in section 4.
3. The status of intuitions in philosophy
Another remark I want to make is about the status of intuitions in philosophy. Lumer
argues that intuitions do not have a place in a good theory of philosophical argument.
Perhaps this is where the distinction between a theory of philosophical theory and a
theory of philosophical argument turns out to be particularly important. For arguably,
intuitions have a crucial place in philosophical theory: intuitions are the starting-points for
all of our theorizing. But intuitions might have a comparatively smaller role to play in
(interpersonal) philosophical argument.
When I say “intuition” I don’t quite mean any of the three things that Lumer includes
under that heading, but it is closest to his sense (2), “Intuitions as unfounded opinions of
the respective author.” As I understand them, intuitions, or “seemings,” have a certain
phenomenal character that is hard to describe but that everyone is presumably familiar
with. (Stephen Colbert has coined the term “truthy” to name this feeling.) Intuitions come
in experiential and intellectual varieties: I have the experiential intuition that I have a fresh
scratch on my hand as I look down at my hand; I have the intellectual intuition that subjects
in Gettier cases lack knowledge. These intuitions / seemings are not always supported by
explicitly formulated discursive reasons, so in that sense they are or at least can be
unsupported. But intuitions are susceptible to being supported by further reasoning,
without losing their status as intuitions. For example: it intuitively seems to me that Modus
Tollens is a good inference form, and I’m sure it seemed that way to me even before I ever
took a course in formal logic and learned to prove Modus Tollens from other even more
obvious rules. Now I know how to prove the classical validity of Modus Tollens on the basis

of Modus Ponens and Reductio ad Absurdum. But independently of that, it still also just
seems to me that Modus Tollens is a good argument form. So that looks like an example of
an intuition that is also independently supported. So I would say instead of unfounded
opinions, intuitions are “truthy” feelings toward propositions. And one can at the same time
have an intuition that p, and believe p, and possess good reasons in support of p.4
My point here is not to try to press a particular account of the nature of intuitions. (I
don’t know that I’d be up to that task even if there were space here to do it.) My point is just
to give an idea of what I mean by the term, and to suggest that intuitions in this sense have
a crucial role to play in some central philosophical views. For example, foundationalist
epistemological theories often make use of them, as the ground level upon which all the
rest of the structure of a person’s justified beliefs is built up. Phenomenal appearances
generate intuitions about the world around us; intellectual intuitions generate basic
principles about genuine support-relations. And many paradigmatic philosophical theories
are based on intuitive verdicts regarding thought experiments (as Lumer notes). Gettier
cases, for example, generate the widespread and typically firmly held intuition that subjects
lack knowledge in those cases. That intuition is a datum that has generated a very large
literature that aims to accommodate it. 5
One important point about intuitions in (moderate) foundationalist epistemological
theories is that intuitions are typically viewed as at least to some extent justified. Intuitions
are not always justified; their justification is defeasible. Someone who has grown up in a
racist household, for example, might have the intuition that she is racially superior to other
people. Although intuitions typically are justified, the intuitive justification of this belief will
normally be defeated by other evidence she possesses. And so I don’t think we really need
to worry about intuitions being unsupportable, or unrevisable, or non-cognitive.
On the other hand, Lumer’s worry about the variability of intuitions across different
subjects, and within subjects but across different ways of framing the same information,
strike me as particularly important for philosophers to address. Still, in constructing
philosophical theories, intuitions often play a very central role, and in the end I don’t see
how we can do without them. But perhaps that’s because I have in mind a slightly different
conception of intuitions that those that Lumer has in mind.
4. The status of bad philosophical arguments / other philosophical arguments
A final question I have, which each of the previous sections has led up to, is about the status
of arguments that we would normally call philosophical arguments, but that do not fit well
into any of Lumer’s four types of philosophical argument. For example, Kant’s
transcendental arguments have an ontic purpose – they aim to show that certain cognitive6
Intuitions needn’t even be always opinions; we can have feelings of truth toward propositions we know to be false,
in which case we won’t believe a proposition that still has a strong intuitive pull for us. See Pust’s entry “Intuitions”
in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, especially sections 1 and 2, for useful discussion of various accounts of
intuition.
5
Another example, which Lumer discusses, is Rawlsian reflective-equilibrium: this strategy takes all of our intuitive
judgments about particular matters of fact (or particular moral judgments) and our intuitive judgments about correct
general principles, and aims to revise our intuitive judgments in ways designed to achieve coherence among our
intuitive judgments.
6
i.e., the spatial and temporal aspects of intuition, and the categories of the understanding.
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and worldly7 structures must be real, as a necessary condition for the possibility of the kind
of experience that we have. But they are not empirical arguments, so they do not fit into the
“descriptive-nomological” theories. And they are not practical, so they do not fit into the
“ontic-practical” theories. Similarly, we might ask about Anselm’s ontological argument for
the existence of God. I don’t see how it could fit into any of the four argument types
discussed in the paper, for the same reasons as in the case of Kant’s transcendental
arguments. Or again, think of Pascal’s argument for belief in God’s existence, as I’ve
suggested it’s formulated (in terms of belief rather than behaviour). That almost fits, but
doesn’t quite fit, the “ontic-practical” category of arguments set out here.
So I wanted to ask about the status of arguments like these. There are several
options. (i) We could count them straightforwardly as philosophical arguments, but bad
ones (assuming they are bad). Or (ii) we could count them as degenerate cases of
philosophical arguments, on the assumption that they cannot satisfy the conditions for
good philosophical arguments of the four ideal types identified here. Or (iii) we could count
them as not philosophical arguments at all.
Option (iii) strikes me as excessively revisionary. Option (i) seems the most
plausible, but I’m not sure that it is in line with Lumer’s idealizing-hermeneutic project in
this paper. Option (ii), of counting these other arguments as degenerate cases of
philosophical argument, seems the most likely. Then we would model these arguments as
aiming at the ideal of philosophical argument, but for one reason or another we would hold
them to be constitutively unable to achieve that ideal.
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